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The Transfer Space 
Abstract 
 
Within the transfer space source and sink exchange substrates (material 
and energy) to selfishly optimize their own productivity. Under certain 
conditions this will lead to a productivity increase of the whole ensemble. 
The present day view that cooperation is the most productive interaction 
between organisms is an illusion. Whenever two not identically equipped 
parties meet with the potential to exchange substrates one party will 
become a source and the other a sink. This is realistically called 
exploitation. The outcome depends on the relation between fix cost, 
variable cost, productivity and affinity. Brute force and educational 
conditioning used by the sink take advantage of emotions to hide the real 
size of cost to the source in exploitation. In case the transfer of 
substrates leads to increased productivity parts of the productivity might 
be reinvested to keep the exploited party. The lasting relationship is 
called wise exploitation. Wise exploitation may last for one or many 
generations depending on the use of brute force, education or breeding. 
All actions have to be viewed under thermodynamic considerations and 
the benefit must always exceed the cost to maintain a stable system. 
This hypothesis explains observations from catalytic networks to 
societies. In addition, the transfer space is also a model to understand 
the decision process under external influence in a single economic entity. 
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Introduction 
 
Cooperation and prisoners´ dilemma 
What is cooperation? Many definitions exist in the different fields of 
research. They all speak of joint interactions and working together of two 
parties for mutual benefits. But this kind of cooperation is hardly - if at all 
- observed. The reason is prisoners´ dilemma. 
 
Axelrod and Hamilton (Axelrod, R. and Hamilton, W. D., 1981) use the 
following and generally accepted matrix to explain prisoners´ dilemma 
(Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 
 
Figure 1. Prisoners´ dilemma, an example. 
 
From arbitrary values they learn that successful exploitation (D) of a 
source may earn more for the individual than cooperation (D>C). The 
best productivity or fitness has the ensemble (Player A+B) if both parties 
cooperate (C+C>C+D>D+D). This is the prisoners´ dilemma – it would 
be better to cooperate, but the temptation to exploit someone or the 
danger of being exploited prevents cooperation (P>S though 
2R>T+S>P+P). As defect is stable (D+D; a Nash equilibrium) it is 
puzzling to many authors why help between two organisms is 
observable. One reason is genetic relation – kin selection (Hamilton, 
W.D., 1964). 
 
An unanswered question in this example is where does the productivity 
come from and why should the productivity in cooperation (C+C) be 
higher than in exploitation (C+D)? This view has evolved a little (Nowak, 
M. A., 2006). This author writes: “a cooperator is someone who pays a 
cost, c for another individual to receive a benefit, b. A defector has no 
cost and does not deal out benefits.” To assume that something (a 
benefit) can only come from something else (a cost) is a step forward. 
However such behavior (giving) is difficult to understand. Giving is an 
altruistic action – it pays in terms of evolution only for offspring and other 
genetic relation. Complex evolutionary epicycles are invented to transfer 
the genetically founded behavior altruism and kin selection to group 
selection with no genetic foundation (“A group of cooperators might be 
more successful than a group of defectors”, same author). The question 
is not answered where this additional fitness (productivity) has its source. 
The answer to this question is important as we live under the law of 
mass and energy conservation - one of the most important empirical 
laws and philosophic meaningful concepts. 
 
As the values are arbitrary other outcomes are possible and would be 
worth to be discussed. A general form should be helpful. Turner and 
Chao (Turner, P. E. and Chao. L., 1999) use an interesting general form 
to explain prisoners´ dilemma (Figure 2). They introduce a further 
simplification: one side will only give and one side will only take. 
 
Figure 2 
 
Figure 2. Prisoners´ dilemma, one side gives (giving is –s1) and one side takes (+s2).  
 
Using the same values as Axelrod and Hamilton we obtain the same 
result. Prisoners´ dilemma is P>S though 2R>T+S>P+P. In this new 
general form prisoners´ dilemma equals 1-s1<1-c. Cooperation (1=1) is 
doing better than exploitation (1-s1<1+s2). We could say: 1+1>1- s1+1+s2. 
 
The transfer space 
What does the generalization (prisoners´ dilemma: c<s1; cooperation is 
better than exploitation: 0>s2-s1 = s2<s1) teach?  
 
It seems there are three variables: s1, s2 and c and they are considered 
independent because the used values were arbitrary. Three independent 
variables may be best arranged in a three dimensional space (Figure 3). 
The size comparison of these variables may teach something like in 
prisoners´ dilemma (not giving, c<s1). The pair wise combinations of 
three variables are: c<s1, c>s1, s2<s1, s2>s1, s2>c and s2<c. 
 
Figure 3 
 
Figure 3. The transfer space formed by the variables c, s1 and s2. The origin of the 
transfer space is where the red lines meet; c=s1=s2=0. The red lines are s2=s1, c=s1 
and s2=c. 
 
What do the variables mean? 
• The variable c is the loss if an exchange does not take place. This 
variable seems to be some kind of fix cost – always present. It is a fix 
cost for both sides. But this fix cost is not necessarily of the same size 
for player A and player B but will be connected by a factor or an 
equation. 
• Although one substrate is transferred the loss to one party is not 
necessarily identical with the gain to the other party (s2>s1, s2<s1)! The 
exchanged substrate will however couple s1 and s2. 
• The variable s1 contains the loss of one party. It consists of the fix cost 
(the essence of a fix cost is the ubiquity; c), the variable cost that is 
connected to the lost substrate (S) and the loss in productivity (p) with 
this lost substrate. 
• The variable s2 contains the gain of the other party. It consists of the fix 
cost (c), the variable cost that is connected to the gained substrate (S) 
and the gain in productivity (p) with this substrate. 
• Productivity (p) is a saturation function. At high saturation the gain in 
productivity is small compared to low saturation for the same amount 
of substrate (S). At high saturation the productivity with this substrate 
may be less earning than the variable cost for this substrate.  
• The substrate (S) is a variable cost with a linear dependence.   
• s1=c+S+p and s2=c+S+p. This helps to understand why there is 
“giving”, “not giving”, “taking” and “not taking” without genetically 
founded altruism involved.    
 
 giving: c>s1 equals c>c+S+p or 0>S+p 
 not giving: c<s1 equals c<c+S+p or 0<S+p 
 taking: s2>c equals c+S+p>c or S+p>0 
 not taking: s2<c equals c+S+p<c or S+p<0 
 
Not giving: The source would lose a highly productive (+p) substrate 
(S). As long as the source is uninfluenced and reasonable it will not 
give the valuable substrate.   
 
Taking: The sink will take the substrate (S) because it will make a 
positive productivity (+p) contribution. 
 
As S is always a positive value, p must be a large negative value (-p) 
in the case of “giving” (0>S+p) and “not taking” (S+p<0).  
 
Giving: A negative productivity loss is a relative productivity gain. 
Giving will increase the productivity! Giving will reduce variable costs 
that do not pay. Giving is a selfish act. It will increase the productivity 
via reducing the amount of substrate not earning the variable cost at 
high saturation. This idea is important for two reasons. Giving is 
reasonable and selfish, economically and thermodynamically founded. 
Giving is not a sacrifice. It is now independent of genetic relation. 
 
Not taking: A negative productivity gain is a productivity loss. The 
second party will not take because a loss in productivity would be 
realized. Increasing the substrate (increase variable costs) at high 
saturation will decrease the relative productivity. This idea is important 
for two reasons. Not taking is not generous, it is reasonable. Not taking 
can prevent worsening of the productivity. It is independent now of 
genetic relation. 
 
Giving (not) and taking (not): This 4 types of behavior meet in the three 
dimensional complex transfer space. The outcome of interactions 
depends on the physiological, emotional, informational and genetic 
condition of the parties. 
 
• The saturating production function determines whether the transfer s1 
to s2 will be productive (s2>s1) or consumptive (s2<s1). The effect is 
that the ensemble will be more or less productive than the sum of the 
single entities. 
• The variables c, S and p will be of typical size for a species/population 
and vary slightly between individuals. 
• The value of the fix cost is considered absolute indispensable by sink 
or source. The value of the variable cost depends on the contribution 
to the productivity (positive or negative). 
 
Now we can give names to the different situations: 
c<s1      prisoners´ dilemma; avoided exploitation, not giving; 
              giving will decrease own productivity 
c>s1      tolerated exploitation, giving improves own productivity 
s2<s1     consumptive exploitation, the system looses productivity 
s2>s1     productive exploitation, the system gains productivity 
s2>c      cost efficient exploitation, taking will increase own productivity 
s2<c      costing exploitation, taking will decrease own productivity 
1-1=0    cooperation, the starting point c=s1=s2=0 
 
• Source and sink are the projection of the transfer space on one side 
(c-s1 and c-s2). The outcome for the system (s1-s2) is a projection of 
the transfer space on the ground. 
• Giving and taking, brute force or informational influence on source and 
sink will change the perception of c, s1 (c+S+p) and s2 (c+S+p). This 
can be interpreted either as a deformation of the transfer space or a 
movement of source and sink along the sides of the transfer space. 
 
 
Discussion  
 
I suggest a new way to look on two parties capable to exchange 
substrates. This idea is able to explain exchange related behavior on 
different levels of complexity (enzymes, organisms - many enzymes - 
and societies - many organisms) and suggests a source of productivity to 
fuel group selection without any genetically or else founded form of 
altruism. Here a purely selfish founded explanation is introduced. Let us 
first discuss important definitions. To do this we should for simplicity 
keep some of the variables zero. 
 
• Cooperation, the entry point into this space: 
Cooperation is now formally the entry point into the transfer space. In 
cooperation nothing is exchanged (s1=s2=0) at no cost (c=0) but the two 
parties are able to exchange. What is usually implied using the word 
cooperation is a point of the coordinates s2>>s1, s1~0, c~0. In this point 
productivity is generated from a small loss at negligible costs and parts 
of the gain are shared. This will be explained later and is called wise 
exploitation. 
 
• Productive and consumptive exploitation; the surface s2-s1: 
Giving and taking create or destroy productivity within the ensemble. The 
productivity gain s2>s1 is the intrinsic power source for the system and is 
called productive exploitation. The transfer of one substrate from a 
saturated condition to an unsaturated condition is the reason for the 
increase in productivity (Figure 4). The increased productivity is realized 
in the sink. The sink controls the gain and this is the maximal reward. 
The ensemble of sink and source together has a better productivity then 
the sum of both parties alone. This is an advantage to the group but on 
cost of the source. The productivity of the source will decrease and 
finally the source will be lost. The advantage to the sink and the group is 
gone. The sink will need new exploitable source from somewhere else. 
The transfer from an unsaturated condition to a saturated condition will 
lead to a decrease in productivity (s2<s1) and is called consumptive 
exploitation (Figure 4). The smaller productivity is realized and controlled 
by the sink. A reward is still obtained but the catch to the sink is smaller 
than the loss to the source. But it is still an advantage to the sink. The 
ensemble of sink and source together has a smaller productivity then the 
sum of both parties alone. This is a disadvantage to the group and in 
addition on cost of the source. The productivity of the source and the 
group will decrease very fast and finally the source will be lost. The sink 
will need new exploitable source from somewhere else. 
 
Figure 4 
 
Figure 4. An example: In case A a source has a fix cost (c) and a variable substrate 
cost (S) and a certain productivity (1p) with this amount of substrate. In a second 
case (B) a different source has the same fix (c) and variable cost (S) as A, but a 
tenfold productivity (10p) with this amount of substrate. The same amount of 
substrate (S) in both cases is transferred to the same sink. With the same amount of 
substrate the sink has a productivity of 5p at identical fix and variable cost. The 
ensemble AC will have a fivefold increased productivity. The productivity of the 
ensemble BC however is cut by half. AC is a productive transfer (s2>s1), BC is a 
consumptive transfer (s2<s1). 
 
• Brute force, the surface c-s1: 
In prisoners´ dilemma (avoided exploitation) nothing is transferred 
because not giving is cheaper (c<s1). Only the fix cost (c) but no highly 
productive substrate is lost. Brute force will increase the cost of “not 
giving”. The size relation will therefore change from c<s1 to c+bf>s1. Now 
the subdominant party will give to optimize own productivity. On one side 
bf is a risky investment. Both sides may be hurt seriously. But once bf is 
effective cheap threatening will make the subdominant party give. 
Threatening evokes an emotion called fear. Fear will hide the true cost of 
giving (s1) (Figure 5). The intensity of brute force and fear correlate 
directly to the amount given.  
 
Figure 5 
 
Figure 5. At first brute force (bf) will increase the fix cost (c) for the subdominant party 
(blue arrow). Giving is induced as variable costs no longer pay at that relationship 
between fix cost, variable cost and productivity (orange arrow). Later fear is sufficient. 
Fear (blue arrow, f) hides the true cost s1 and induces giving (orange arrow) at lower 
fix costs. The red line separates c>s1 and c<s1. 
 An interpretation of fear could be that the additional fix cost is 
transformed to a variable cost. Now the relative productivity seems to be 
decreased with this larger amount of variable cost. Variable cost is given 
to increase own productivity.  
 
• Education, the surface c-s1: 
Education is used in intelligent species. It is difficult to determine the true 
degree of saturation in a complex organism. Manifold, different and 
complex internal and external information has to be processed. This 
processing can be manipulated through appropriate additional 
information. Education is an investment by one party to influence the 
behavior of a second party. Education as external information is capable 
to change the perception of the relation between fix cost (c), variable 
cost (S) and productivity (p). This changes the behavior of the source 
from “not giving” to “giving”. Emotions (hope, h) hide the true size of the 
loss (s1). The role of emotions in cooperation related behavior has been 
addressed (Fessler and Haley, 2002). An alternative interpretation is that 
the whole space is deformed and the source judges the own position and 
the border between c<s1 and c>s1 differently and will give (Figure 6a). 
Giving will stop at c=s1. The size of the difference (c minus s1) 
determines how intensive education and hope have to be.  
 
Positive emotions conditioned through education and induced by the sink 
will transform fix cost to variable cost in the source. Now the relative 
productivity is decreased with this larger amount of variable cost. 
Variable cost is given to the sink to increase own productivity. This is the 
interpretation of the source although the real balance is different and a 
objective loss to the source is realized! 
 
Figure 6a 
 
Figure 6a. Education manipulates the perception of the fix cost (blue arrow, e) and 
giving is induced (orange arrow). Hope (blue arrow, h, educational conditioning of 
endogenous reward systems) is induced and hides the true cost (s1) and giving is 
induced (short orange arrow). Education can also change the perception of the whole 
exchange space and induce giving (long orange arrow) directly. The red lines 
separate c>s1 and c<s1.  
 
Negative emotions: 
Hate is an example for negative emotions. Hate may involve two or three 
parties, one or two competing ensembles. 
Two parties: The action (e) of a sink may induce hate of a source. The 
source is moved from giving (c>s1) to not giving (c-e<s1) (Figure 6b). It 
seems to the source as if parts of the indispensable fix cost have been 
lost. They must be replaced by variable costs. The residual variable cost 
seems to be much more productive and has now an increased value. A 
highly productive substrate is not given away. The emotion hate makes 
the source evaluate the relationship between c, S and p differently. Also 
the transfer space could be deformed. Hate makes the source 
overestimate the size of the loss s1. 
Three parties: Hate is educational (through information; either true or 
false) induced by a third party in a source to avoid giving to a sink so that 
there will be more residual reserves for the third party or that the 
productive interaction between source and sink is disrupted. Less 
productivity will be an advantage to the competing ensemble the third 
party is a part of.  
 
Figure 6b 
 
Figure 6b. Education manipulates the perception of the fix cost (blue arrow, e) and 
giving ends. Hate makes the source overestimate the size of the loss s1. A different 
interpretation is an increased value of the variable cost because lost fix cost had to 
be replaced with parts of the variable cost increasing the value of the residual 
variable cost. The intensity of hate is direct proportional to the resulting size of the 
difference c<s1. The red line separates c>s1 and c<s1.  
 
• Brute force, the surface c-s2: 
In cost efficient exploitation (s2>c) taking is cheap and effective for the 
dominant party but the subdominant party may not be willing to give 
because the status there is not saturated anymore. Brute (counter) force 
will increase the cost of taking. The size relation will therefore change 
from s2>c to s2<c+bf. Now the dominant party will no longer take 
because the border to costing exploitation is exceeded. Also here bf is a 
risky investment. Both sides may be hurt seriously. But once bf is 
effective cheap threatening will make the dominant party recoil from 
taking. Threatening evokes an emotion called fear. Fear is an emotion 
and will hide the true gain of taking (s2) (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7 
 
Figure 7. At first brute force (bf) will increase the fix cost (c) for the dominant party 
(blue arrow). Not taking is induced at that relationship between cost and productivity 
(costing exploitation). Later fear (f) is sufficient. Fear (f) hides the true gain s2. The 
red line separates s2>c and s2<c. In the described case giving back could be a result 
as the border s2=c is exceeded. 
 
A fight could be interpreted as a test which party is nearer to the border 
of giving/not giving – taking/not taking. Or: Who is more and who is less 
saturated? The minimal intensity of the counterforce is determined by the 
distance to the border s2=c. But it should be clear that in every 
production function the most left point is zero. At high saturation there 
may be low productivity but there is also endurance. s1 or s2=c+S+p 
could also be interpreted as a space with many different positions. 
 • Education, the surface c-s2: 
Usually the exploiting party (sink) will educate the exploited party 
(source) to tolerate exploitation. This may lead to exhaustion of the 
exploited party and a decrease of productivity of the whole ensemble. 
Ensembles with low productivity will be defeated by ensembles with high 
productivity. The highest productivity will be reached at optimal 
distribution of material and energy (substrates) between both parties so 
that both are combined maximal productive.  Therefore, it could be in the 
interest of the exploiting party to restrain from complete exploitation of 
the exploited party.  
Education as investment could originate in the dominant party but also 
within the subdominant party to change the behavior of the dominant 
party. The dominant party is changed from “taking” to “not taking”. The 
perception of the size of the fix cost (c) is changed by education (e). 
Emotions (hope, h) hide here the size of s2, the possible gain and 
reward. A different interpretation is that the exchange space is deformed 
and the addressed party judges the position of the border between s2>c 
and s2<c differently and will not take (Figure 8a). Not taking will stop at 
c=s2. The size of the difference (s2 minus c) determines how intensive 
education and hope (emotions) have to be to avoid taking. 
 
Positive emotions conditioned through education and induced by source 
or sink will transform fix cost to variable cost in the sink. Now the relative 
productivity is decreased with this larger amount of variable cost. 
Variable cost is no longer taken by the sink because this would decrease 
own productivity further. This is the interpretation of the sink although the 
real balance will be different. 
 
Figure 8a 
 
Figure 8a. Education manipulates the perception of the fix cost (blue arrow, e). Hope 
(h, emotions, blue arrow; an educational conditioning of the endogenous reward 
system) is induced and hides the true gain. Education can also change the whole 
judgment of the exchange space and the perception of the own position within that 
space (from s2>c to s2<c). In this case giving back would be induced in the sink 
(orange arrow). 
 
Negative emotions: 
Hate is a negative emotion. Again hate may involve two or three parties, 
one or two competing ensembles.  
Two parties: The action (e) of a source may induce hate of a sink. The 
sink is moved from not taking (s2<c) to taking (s2>c-e) (Figure 8b). Now it 
appears to the sink as if parts of the fix cost have been taken away. The 
indispensable fix cost must be replaced with variable costs. New variable 
cost will increase productivity. This new variable cost is taken from the 
sink in hate. Alternatively the transfer space could be deformed. 
Three parties: Hate is educational induced in the sink by a third party to 
induce taking from a source to harm the source. This may have the effect 
that the source is overstressed and the productivity of the ensemble will 
decrease in a competitive situation between two ensembles.  
 
Figure 8b 
 
Figure 8b. Education to hate manipulates the perception of the fix cost (blue arrow, e) 
in the sink. Hate (blue arrow) is induced and exaggerates the true gain. Taking is 
induced. The red line separates s2>c and s2<c.  
 
• Harmful exploitation; the surface s2-s1 and the effect of brute force, 
education and breeding. 
As long as the source is in c>s1 the source will selfishly give to increase 
own productivity – in case a sink will take. This is an advantage through 
increased productivity to all sides: source, sink and the ensemble. No 
party is harmed or suffers. 
 
If taking by the sink is larger than the additional productivity through 
giving the source will approach c=s1. As soon as the source arrives at 
c=s1 further taking would decrease productivity of the source and 
therefore giving by the source will selfish end. The exploited party is at 
first lost to prisoners´ dilemma. A source also may be right from the very 
beginning of the contact in prisoners´ dilemma. If the sink wants to take 
in prisoners´ dilemma two possibilities exist. 
 Exploitation with brute force, (s2-s1-bf>0) or (s2-s1-bf<0): 
Brute force (bf) is an investment of the exploiting party (sink) to induce 
giving by the source in prisoners´ dilemma. Fear (f) hides the true size of 
s1 but is imaginary and therefore not added (Figure 9).  
Exploitation with education, (s2-s1-e>0) or (s2-s1-e<0): 
Education (e) is an investment of the exploiting party (sink) to induce 
giving by the source in prisoners´ dilemma. Hope (h, a complex of 
conditioned positive emotions. The reward exists only in the brain.) is 
virtual and therefore not added (Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9 
 
Figure 9. The investments brute force (bf) and education (e) always contain a reward 
for the exploiting party. The red line separates now the area where the investment 
(bf, e) is overcompensated (>0, wise) and where the investment (bf, e) is not 
overcompensated (<0) by the gain through the transfer. The red triangle (c<s1) is 
prisoners´ dilemma (not giving). But giving is induced through brute force and 
educational conditioning. 
 
The use of brute force and education changes the behavior of the 
exploited party in prisoners´ dilemma from not giving to giving. But this 
behavior is harmful and not reasonable. The productivity of the source 
will further decrease and then the source will be lost completely 
(physically) through extinction or consumption.  
In rare cases the source may be saturated and wants to give to optimize 
own productivity but the saturated sink does not want to take. Brute force 
or education (e.g. subvention) may also be used here to make the sink 
take although this is not reasonable. This will be harmful to the 
productivity of the sink.  
 
Why can it be evolutionary stable to take in prisoners´ dilemma?  
How can the loss of the exploited party be avoided? 
 
• Productive wise exploitation with brute force (s2-s1-bf>0): 
Brute force between different species:  
The transfer of the substrate between two different species may lead to a 
higher productivity of the ensemble so that the investment (bf) is 
overcompensated. This leads to productive wise exploitation with brute 
force and fear (s2-s1-bf>0). Wise refers to the fact that the gain will pay 
the investment including a reward. Brute force in enzymes is a higher 
affinity. In primitive organisms fear will be absent. The ensemble with 
such a behavior will succeed against other not so productive ensembles 
of different species or single competing species. However, the source 
will suffer a decrease in fitness and therefore vanish. The ensemble may 
succeed against competing groups on the short run but it will only 
survive on the long run if parts of the gain are also used to breed the 
source. An example would be the leafcutter ant with the fungus grown in 
their garden. Parts of the living fungus are eaten (bf) but also bred (br). 
Leafcutter ants form the largest colonies of all ants. Grazing and hunting 
use brute force to exploit the source but usually no breeding of the 
source is observed. This leads only to predator-prey type stability 
(Prigogine, I. 1977). If the transfer is consumptive (s2-s1-bf<0) the 
dominant party needs continuous influx of exploitable individuals also but 
the productivity is far below the single parties. The small reward to the 
sink may be enough to push through against a single competitor without 
an additional resource. 
Brute force within the same species:  
Naturally emerging asymmetries (male/female; young/old, strong/weak) 
may serve the same purpose as breeding. With every new generation 
the consumed sources are replaced resulting in a higher productivity of 
the ensemble of e.g. strong and weak. The increased productivity (s2-s1-
bf>0) comes from the species internal transfer. This could be called self-
exploitation. Every species produces surplus offspring. This surplus is 
partly consumed by disasters, diseases, predators and starvation. In self 
exploitation part of the surplus is transformed into e.g. more muscles or 
larger fat reserves or more offspring of the dominant animal. This may 
lead to a better survival or better competitiveness of the whole group 
against other groups but on cost of the source. 
 
• Productive wise exploitation with education (s2-s1-e>0):  
The transfer of the substrate to the exploiting party (sink) may lead to a 
higher productivity of the ensemble so that the investment education (e) 
is overcompensated. This leads to productive wise exploitation with 
education to hope (s2-s1-e>0). In this case the ensemble with such a 
behavior will succeed against other not so productive ensembles or 
single parties. However, the educated party will suffer a decrease in 
fitness in c<s1 (prisoners´ dilemma). The ensemble may succeed against 
competing groups on the short run but it will only survive on the long run 
if parts of the gain are also used to stabilize the exploited party. If the 
transfer is consumptive (s2-s1-e<0) the dominant party needs continuous 
influx of exploitable individuals also. This behavior is not self sustainable 
and will only continue as long as no better competitors arise and the 
influx is constant. The long term physical loss of the exploited party in 
prisoners´ dilemma using brute force or education can be only 
counteracted through breeding. 
 
• Productive wise exploitation with breeding (s2-s1-br>0): 
All animals and man depend on an energy and substrate source. If the 
source is consumed completely the sink can no longer survive. Taking 
from a source will decrease the productivity of the source and finally 
consume the source. The source must be replaced if the sink will use the 
source further. Two possibilities exist.  
First: New sources must be found. This will only be the case when the 
source is produced somewhere else unhindered and unconsumed and a 
surplus leaks to the place where it will be consumed. Or the energy 
reserves are big enough to carry the sink there. This situation reminds of 
a predator-prey relationship in biology. This is the case (consumptive or 
productive exploitation) as long as breeding is absent.  
Second: The sink uses parts of the gain to replace the consumed source 
through breeding. Though the source is consumed, new source will 
replace the loss. This is called wise exploitation with breeding: s2-s1-
br>0, the essence of farming. The productivity gain (s2-s1>0, productive 
exploitation) is so big that besides a reward a reinvestment (br) into the 
stability of the source can be made. Due to the reinvestment breeding is 
not as much earning as complete exploitation but will last longer.  
 
• Several forms of productive wise exploitation, a comparison: 
When s2>>s1 there will be so much productivity generated that besides a 
reward for the exploiting party parts of the gain may be reinvested to 
stabilize the source. This is called productive wise exploitation (a special 
case of productive exploitation, Figure 10). Due to the reinvestment 
(productive) wise exploitation is earning less than productive exploitation 
in the same spot but it will last longer. The productivity gain to the system 
is no miraculous violation of mass and energy conservation. The gain is 
a result of the transfer of a substrate from a flat part of a production 
function (saturated, source) to the steep part of another production 
function (not saturated, sink).  
 
Figure 10 
 
Figure 10. At small fix and variable costs and high productivity (low saturation) in the 
sink and low productivity (high saturation) in the source the region of wise exploitation 
is in reach (blue arrow, 1). This region is also in reach by inventions to increase the 
leverage (2). At higher costs and lower productivity in the source only the region of 
productive exploitation (3) can be reached. But a reward will always be gained and 
the ensemble is more productive than the single parties. The size of the reward and 
the size of the necessary investment determine when wise exploitation will be 
reached. Productive exploitation is also in reach adding several smaller contributions 
from several sources (4). Finally at very high cost (or low costs and high productivity; 
s1=c+S+p) only consumptive exploitation is reached. A reward is still earned but here 
the productivity of the ensemble is below the productivity of both parties. In example 
3, 4 and 5 the source must come from somewhere else to maintain the system. The 
red line separates s2>s1 from s2<s1. 
 
Breeding, brute force and education are different forms of wise 
exploitation. Breeding (s2-s1-br>0) is a long lasting investment of the 
exploiting party into the exploited party. This is driven by the gain from 
the transfer of the substrate to a better production function. Breeding will 
last many generations although wise exploitation is less earning than 
productive exploitation in the same spot. Pure productive exploitation will 
consume the source push trough against direct competitors and 
disappear when there is no source anymore. If both strategies are not in 
permanent contact and only in indirect competition reinvesting strategies 
win. In intelligent species exploitation will be detected very fast. Here - on 
the short run within one lifetime - brute force and education prevent the 
loss of the exploited party, too. The loss here is to be understood as 
entering prisoners´ dilemma (not giving). As long as the source exists it 
can be exploited repeatedly in hope and fear. This will harm the source 
and lead to suffering (decreased own productivity). This middle term 
strategy of exploitation may be also part of pure productive or 
consumptive exploitation. 
As long as there is influx of exploitable entities or self sustaining 
breeding, harmful exploitation starting in prisoners´ dilemma is 
evolutionary stable. 
 
• Productive wise exploitation within the complete exchange space: 
The three variables s1, s2 and c shape the exchange space. Within this 
space we observe self-ordering. If c>s1 giving will be no problem as 
giving will improve the productivity of the source. To give in avoided 
exploitation (prisoners´ dilemma, c<s1) would decrease the productivity of 
the source and is therefore not reasonable and will lead to exhaustion if 
induced by brute force or education. On the other side taking will only be 
observed if s2>c (cost efficient exploitation). Costing exploitation (s2<c) 
would lead to a decrease in productivity of the sink.  
 
Additional consequences are to be discussed: 
 
1. Taking not and giving deliberately are observed with high fix costs 
and high saturation. This is rare and will not lead to wise 
exploitation due to the high fix costs (Figure 11,1). The outcome of 
s2<c and c>s1 depends on the degree of saturation and on specific 
affinities. However there is also a small sector with low fix costs 
(Figure 11,2). 
2. Once giving deliberately (c>s1) and taking (s2>c) are combined the 
productivity of the source and the ensemble will increase very 
much (11,2). But taking will not end if saturation (s2<c) is not 
reached for the sink. The source will cross the border (c=s1) and 
then move on to prisoners´ dilemma (c<s1) (Figure 11,3).  
3.  Taking from prisoners´ dilemma (giving not) is attractive as fix 
costs are very low (c<s1) (Figure 11,3). Only the use of brute force 
and education is able to realize this. The productivity of the 
ensemble will end when the source is consumed without breeding. 
But until then the ensemble is more productive. 
4. The subspace s2-s1-br-2c>0 (or s2-s1-br-2c-bf>0) is producing the 
surplus and long term stability to fuel co-evolution (Figure 11).  
5. The upper part and left part of the subspace of wise exploitation 
can be also under control of the sink. Then we observe “true 
symbiosis”. True symbiosis occupies partly the same space as 
wise exploitation assuming that the source can stop giving at (c=s1) 
and the sink is then no longer able to take (Figure 11, arrow 2). 
6. Wise exploitation is under the control of the sink, true symbiosis is 
under the control of the source. 
 
Figure 11 
 
Figure 11. In this example the transformation s1 to s2 is very effective (high 
productive in s2), the blue arrows are very long. High fix costs and saturation will 
lead to the behavior of giving deliberately, but even at high productivity the 
transfer will not reach the corner of wise exploitation as 2c has to be paid (arrow 
1). At small fix and variable costs wise exploitation is in reach (2: s2-s1-br-2c>0; 3: 
s2-s1-br-2c-bf or s2-s1-br-2c-e>0). Giving will be deliberately in 2. Education and 
brute force have to be used to induce giving in 3 and 4. At higher costs or higher 
productivity in the source only the region of productive exploitation (4: s2-s1-2c-
bf>0 or s2-s1-2c-e>0) will be in reach. An example for consumptive exploitation is 
not depicted here.  
 
In general the final benefit (b) to cost (c) ratio for organisms and societies 
must be larger than zero (b/c>0) to lead to stability and growth. The 
benefit could be interpreted as the productivity (p) per used substrate 
(variable cost, S). The cost (c) is the total cost (fix cost).  
 
7. Matrix and Vector calculations would be an appropriate treatment 
(Figure 12) to understand the complete ensemble. 
 
Figure 12 
 
Figure 12. In this graphical interpretation “giving” is -s1 and “taking” is +s2. Two 
vectors begin at the origin and point either onto the negative side of the transfer 
space (right side of the blue surface, consumptive exploitation) or the positive 
portion of the transfer space (left side of the blue surface, productive exploitation). 
The endpoint of the vector is determined by the size of s2, s1 and c (green lines). 
 
• The external energy source 
All actions of life depend on the external energy from the sun (a few 
exceptions exist). The suns energy is collected by plants and handed 
over from consumers of different levels to man in the food chain. The 
loss of energy in each step is about 90%. The empirical law of mass and 
energy conservation is strictly obeyed on all levels! On each level of the 
food chain the residual 10% are handed over via consumption of 
generated surplus in form of offspring or offspring related products. Only 
two offspring will survive statistically under stable conditions. The rest is 
consumed and transformed into productivity and activity of the next 
trophic level. Man is the final stage of the food chain (usually). If man 
invests all collected energy and substrates into offspring, density 
dependent problems will arise (disease, aggression, starvation). Man can 
also transform the substrates and energy into other activities 
(manufacture, construction, art, science, etc). But energy and material 
can be spent only once for physical activity or reproduction and related 
activities. Productivity will result either in offspring or in economic 
productivity or a mixture with less offspring and suboptimal economic 
productivity. The transformation process leads to a decrease in fertility as 
recently published (Myrskylä, M., Kohler, H.-P., Billari, F.C., 2009). The 
transformation process comes to saturation at an offspring amount 
between three and two as expected. A speed limit is reached when all 
substrate and energy determined to produce offspring is converted to 
economic activity. If all activity is transformed into economic productivity 
the productivity will be maximal for a short while and then the population 
will break down if no influx of new exploitable entities follows. 
 
 
Interpretation 
 
Enzymes 
Enzymes are biological catalysts. Their production function is a 
saturation curve. The behavior is predictable by thermodynamics and 
reaction kinetics. In a test tube their activity and productivity depends on 
external physical and chemical parameters (pH, temperature, substrate 
concentration, product concentration etc) and intrinsic features (substrate 
affinity, specificity, etc). Source and sink in the test tube depends purely 
on reaction kinetics. If a system of identical enzymes is not well mixed 
there may be local substrate concentration differences and therefore 
productivity differences. The combination of local substrate depletion 
(S+p>0) with potential high productivity and local substrate surplus 
(S+p<0) with low productivity will lead to a higher overall activity after 
mixing. After mixing differences in productivity are due to differences in 
intrinsic features. Enzymes never give beyond the border to prisoners´ 
dilemma (c=s1; 0=S+p) in a well mixed solution. A thermodynamic view 
of economy has already been developed. (Eric Smith and Duncan K. 
Foley, 2005) Enzymes are important active building blocks of organisms.  
 
Organisms 
Cells and organisms are partially closed and not identically equipped. 
The enzymes in their bodies are in different states of saturation. This 
different degree of saturation leads to different behavior. Only hungry 
animals graze or hunt. Many enzymes in their bodies are not saturated. 
Saturated animals will not graze or hunt because their enzymes are 
saturated.  
Brute force is a fact in animal societies. (Clutton-Brock, T.H., 2009 and 
Clutton-Brock, T.H. and Parker, G.A., 1995). Animals respond to brute 
force from other animals. They will not feed or mate and leave the 
opportunity to dominant animals. Brute force is an investment by the 
dominant animal and will not be used all the time as fear will be induced. 
Fear makes the subdominant animal obey. Brute force in intra species 
conflicts is generally observed and therefore evolutionary stable. What is 
the reason?  
Dominance is a result of mutual aggression and fight. Dominant animals 
have been successful in such conflicts. Therefore, their genes must be 
fitter. They are more productive (e.g. more muscles, faster reactions). 
Taking away food from weaker animals will only increase the productivity 
of the ensemble if: s2-s1-bf>0. This seems to be the case because we 
observe many species with this behavior. Why is that so? The 
consequence of the law of energy and mass conservation is that mass 
and energy will stay either within one species/population or are 
transferred to another species/population. Weak animals are either 
consumed partially or completely by another species (e.g. pathogen, 
predator) or they are “consumed” by their own species. This seems to be 
of advantage to ensembles with brute force as investment. Material and 
energy stay in the same species/population and are productive there. 
 
Organisms of different degree of complexity take care for their offspring – 
others not.  Infanticide with cannibalism is observed (Bluffer Hrdy, S., 
1979) – this is a surprise. Altruism is not generally observed and it is not 
dependent on complexity. Could there be another reason for genetically 
founded altruism? Highly productive organisms produce much offspring. 
They do not take care but sow the offspring. It would be expected that 
high productivity is connected to low saturation. Organisms with scare 
offspring invest the productivity not completely into the production of 
progeny. Therefore they are saturated. In saturation the productivity of 
the ensemble of progeny and parent will become higher if material and 
energy is transferred from the saturated partner (parent, source) to the 
unsaturated partner (offspring, sink). Not only genetic tradition but also 
economics makes parental care under saturated condition a successful 
behavior. Now we can interpret infanticide with cannibalism differently. 
The flow of material and energy is reversed when the probability of a 
successful investment due to a dangerous environment (stress) has 
become too low. 
The economic decision process in man has rational and irrational 
components. The rational decision to give or to give not (money, goods, 
help) and take or take not (money, goods, help) depends on the 
expected outcome (s2>s1 - get more than give away or s2<s1; the 
ensemble is here the individual simultaneously exchanging money for 
goods). The expectation is either realistic or not realistic. This depends 
on the quality and intention of the underlying information (cultural 
tradition, neutral or intentional information by others, etc). 
 
Societies  
Man seems to behave completely unexpected. Enzymes behave rational 
controlled by thermodynamics - man does not. Man does not have all 
information necessary and big parts of information given to him (cultural 
tradition, personal information by others) are systematically aimed to 
manipulate and disguise him. Education and emotional conditioning is 
able to modify the behavior in a way that individual harm is the outcome. 
The group may have an advantage. Emotions are a product of man´s 
evolutionary history. They summarize complex situations and are prone 
to be manipulated. 
The degree of saturation is difficult to determine in complex 
multidimensional systems. On the background of different genetic and 
informational equipment two parties with the potential to exchange goods 
meet. Both sides give and take, do not give and do not take. The fix cost, 
the variable cost and the productivity is different on both sides. 
Information of different quality (wrong by accident, deliberately wrong, 
partially right, right) is processed on the background of different 
educational conditioning and prejudgments. In addition the costs and 
productivity and the informational content change within time and in 
dependence of former decisions. The result is a complex, constantly 
changing space. The outcome of exchange decisions is partly rational 
and seems partly irrational with severe consequences for the individual 
and the group. A rational decision to give (optimize own productivity) 
may be wrong because the underlying information was intentional wrong 
to induce giving. Suffering of the source (biologically or personally) will 
give a reward to the sink and may foster the productivity of the group. 
Economic growth seems to be a transfer of material and energy from 
reproduction to production. The success of a group may relay on the 
suffering of individuals. But suffering of the source will not guarantee the 
productive success of the group – it may only serve the consumptive well 
being of the sink. As always in evolution - success is a feature of the 
successful - the timescale has to be observed. 
Emotions could be a byproduct of evolution. Emotions (fear, love, pride, 
etc) reduce the fix cost in the induction of giving, not giving, taking and 
not taking. A reduction of fix cost will increase the productivity of this 
group. 
The transfer space helps to understand the effect of brute force, 
education (motivation) and emotions in general but also purely economic 
phenomena like subvention or corruption can be explained.  
 
 
Summary 
 
A saturated source with usually high fix cost and low productivity will give 
voluntarily to a not saturated sink to reduce not earning variable costs 
and optimize own productivity. The transfer of a substrate from a 
saturated production function to an unsaturated production function 
leads to a productivity increase of the ensemble. This is called productive 
exploitation. The collective advantage may help that the ensemble will 
prevail against competitors. The productivity gain however is controlled 
by the sink. The source will give voluntarily until prisoners´ dilemma is 
reached. 
The asymmetry of the beginning and the control of the gain enable the 
sink to exploit the source further to completeness using brute force or 
education not to detect prisoners´ dilemma. The sink will use the gain to 
exploit new sources as long as they are available. When all sources are 
completely exploited the system will collapse. Stability here is dependent 
on the continuous influx of new exploitable sources. This reminds of a 
predator-prey system in biology. 
A lasting, self sustaining stability is reached when the gain from the 
transfer is big enough to pay besides a reward to the sink the necessary 
reinvestment into the stability of the source. The source is preserved 
through breeding on the long run. This is called wise exploitation. The 
system will prevail against the exploiting system on the long run but not 
in direct confrontation. 
Saturation is a rare event in the real world! A source having a lower 
saturation than the sink will not give (prisoners´ dilemma). Here brute 
force or education to not detect the loss may be used from the beginning 
to change the behavior from “not giving” to “giving”. Starting in prisoners´ 
dilemma is attractive as the fix costs are low. The price is paid by the 
source. Productive and consumptive exploiting systems as well as 
sustainable systems in combination with breeding may originate here 
also. The reward in productive exploitation is larger than in wise 
exploitation with breeding. Sustainable systems will only prevail in 
indirect competition. A saturated sink with high fix cost and low 
productivity will not take deliberately. The reasonable sink will only take 
when it pays. But also the sink can be manipulated to take and harm the 
own productivity. Game theory seems to be only a small slice of a whole 
exchange space. The understanding and prediction of behavior on the 
basis of classic game theory must lead to confusing results and 
unexplainable observations as there are more behavioral types besides 
“not giving”, “no exchange at no cost” and “consumptive exploitation”. 
The transfer space is able to explain the effect of brute force and 
emotional as well as informational manipulation of source and sink. 
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